This paper concerns itself with an underpublicized, but in many
respects highly significant episode of current Eastern European
history: In 1995, a Gagauz Autonomous Region had been set up by
the Moldovan government. The importance of this seemingly not
so relevant event derives from the fact that it was the first
time a territorial autonomy had been established for an ethnic
minority in Central and Eastern Europe.
The paper tries to introduce the process that led to this development,
analyses the institutions of the autonomy itself, and, finally,
makes an attempt to draw conclusions as regards its precedent
value for the region.
The Gagauz community in Southern Moldova is a people of Turkic
origin, the predecessors of whom fled the continuous Russian-Ottoman
wars in the Balkans in the 18th century. They were settled in
Bessarabia by the Russian Empress Catherine II, on condition that
they convert to the orthodox religion. Today, of all Turkic peoples,
Christianity is predominant only among the Gagauz (besides the
Chuvash). In addition to Moldova, much smaller Gagauz communities
also live in Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Greece and
Turkey.
According to official data, currently about 153,000 Gagauz, comprising
3,5% of the country's total population, live in an almost homogenous
3000 km² block of territory in the southern part of the Republic
of Moldova. Most (92%) consider Gagauz as their native language,
but 73% also use Russian as a second language. Only 4%, however,
speak Moldavian (Romanian).
In 1989, the nationalistic Popular Front, advocating a union with
Romania, came to power in Chisinau. The various non-Moldovan nationalities,
comprising more than one third of the country's population, reacted
with anxiety, and pursued separatist policies. The process accelerated
after the Republic of Moldova declared its independence in August
1991. As it is well known, these developments resulted in an open
war between the government and the Transdniester Russians in 1992,
but tensions also heightened in the southern Gagauz-populated
territories. Armed militias had been formed, which quickly took
control of the region, and the Gagauz established their own self-governing
administrative institutions, as well. Consequently, the sovereignty
of Chisinau over these territories had practically ceased to exist
by early 1992.
Nevertheless, the chances of resolving the conflict by peaceful
means were much higher than in the case of Transdniester, since
occasional armed clashes did not escalate and, subsequently, the
death toll remained very low. Moreover, as opposed to the Transdniester
region, the mainstream of the self-proclaimed Gagauz leadership
never questioned the territorial integrity of the Republic of
Moldova, only in case of the later's occasional union with Romania.
Hard-liners within the Gagauz leadership, who even appealed to
Moscow for the inclusion of their breakaway republic in the Russian
Federation, had been quickly isolated. In these circumstances,
negotiations on territorial autonomy for the Gagauz-populated
territories began as early as September 1992, between Moldovan
President Mircea Snegur and a Gagauz delegation headed by `Gagauz
Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman' Mikhail Kendigelyan.(1)
The events of 1993-94 paved the way for full normalisation of
relations between the majority population and the Gagauz. Forces
spearheaded by President Mircea Snegur, emphasizing a separate
identity of the Moldovan people, systematically pursued an independent-minded
policy by rejecting any attempt that called for a more 'fraternal'
relationship with Romania. The pro-Bucharest Popular Front suffered
a shattering defeat at the February 1994 elections, and over 90%
of the population voted in favor of independence at the March
6 referendum.
The newly formed coalition government, consisting of the anti-unionist
Democratic Agrarian Party and the Socialist Party, was much more
receptive towards concerns of the two breakaway republics than
the previous one, and was also keen on closing as soon as possible
at least one of the ongoing disputes. A new Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova was adopted in July 1994, Article 111 of which
made provisions for the autonomy of the Transdniester and the
Gagauz regions, to be detailed in organic laws due for enactment
by 1 January 1995.(2)
The Act Providing for the Special Status of Gagauzia/Gagauz-Yeri
(No. 344-XIII.) was adopted by Parliament on December 23, 1994.(3)
The final version had been born after long and hard bargaining
which included a series of compromises on both sides. It is worth
noting that Turkey played a crucial role all along, promising
investments and development assistance for the Southern regions.(4)
According to the preamble, the aim of the Act is to provide for
the preservation of the Gagauz national identity, the flourishing
of the Gagauz language and culture, and to secure political and
economic independence to this nationality. The paragraph places
special emphasis on the point that within the autonomous territory
to be created, all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are considered
to be equal.
Article 1 defines that, being a manifestation of the self-determination
of the Gagauz people, Gagauz-Yeri is an autonomous unit of special
status and, as such, an integral component of the Republic of
Moldova. That is, by granting collective rights to the minority,
the Act also provides for internal self-determination which
in no way challenges or even questions the territorial integrity
of the country concerned. Nevertheless, the article mentions Gagauz
external self-determination, as well: This may be accomplished
in case the status of the Republic of Moldova as an independent
state changes (i.e. if the union with Romania occurs). Considering
the current circumstances (the serious misgivings of the Moldovans
regarding a 'Greater Romania'), however, this possibility remains
only a theoretical one for the foreseeable future.(5)
According to the Act, the territory of Gagauz-Yeri consists of
all those localities where the proportion of the Gagauz population
exceeds 50%; local referenda were to be held in areas where this
number is below 50%. Referenda deciding whether the settlement
concerned wanted to belong to the autonomous region, or not. Official
languages of Gagauz-Yeri are Moldovan, Gagauz and Russian, but
the usage of other languages (e.g. Bulgarian) is secured, as well.
As far as symbols are concerned, flags and coat-of-arms of Gagauz-Yeri
are to be used equally with those of the Republic of Moldova.
Lands, subsoil, waters and other natural resources are property
of the Republic of Moldova, but they form the economic basis of
Gagauz-Yeri.
Legislation rests with the Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri (Halc Toplosu):
it has a mandate of lawmaking powers within its own jurisdiction.
This includes provisions on education, culture, local development,
budgetary and taxation issues, social security, and questions
of territorial administration. These mandates are similar to those
of the regions of Italy, but the Gagauz Assembly has two
special powers, as well: it may participate in the formulation
of Moldova's internal and foreign policy, and Halc Toplosu
also has a right of appeal to the Constitutional Court of the
Republic of Moldova, in case central regulations interfere with
the jurisdiction of Gagauz-Yeri. Such regulations, if they are
found to be unconstitutional by the Court, are to be abolished.
In turn, those regulations of Halc Toplosu that are in
conflict with the laws enacted by Chisinau, are null and void.
Laws adopted by the Assembly are sent to the Governor of Gagauz-Yeri
for signing; in case of disagreement, the law concerned goes back
to the Halc Toplosu. However, the Governor's decision may
be overridden by a repeated two thirds majority vote. The law
goes into effect on the date of its declaration.
The highest-ranking administrative official of Gagauz-Yeri is
the Governor (Bascan), who is elected directly by the population
of the autonomous territory for a 4-year mandate. Eligibility
for governorship (besides Moldovan citizenship and a 35-year minimum
age requirement) only includes fluency in the Gagauz language.
The bascan is by definition a member of the Government
of the Republic of Moldova. He is confirmed by the President in
this latter capacity. By issuing resolutions and decrees that
are to be executed on the territory of Gagauzia, the Governor
exercises control over all the administrative authorities of Gagauz-Yeri,
and he is responsible for the implementation of all the powers
he is mandated with.
Permanent executive power in Gagauz-Yeri rests with the Executive
Committee (Bakannik Komiteti), members of which are appointed,
on the proposal of the Governor, by a simple majority vote in
the Assembly at its first session. The Committee secures the application
of the laws of the Republic of Moldova and, of course, those of
the Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri. It is also keeping contact with central
authorities in all those issues that in some way are connected
to the autonomous region.
Main fields of its governmental powers, with the right of initiating
bills in the Assembly are the following: regulation of property,
determining the structure and priority policies of national socio-economic,
technical, scientific and cultural development, drafting and (after
the Assembly's approval) executing the annual budget, securing
the equality of citizens in terms of their legal rights, the rule
of law and public safety. Other mandates include rational exploitation
of natural resources with a special emphasis on its environmental
and ecological aspects, and guaranteeing the development of national
languages and cultures on the territory of Gagauz-Yeri.
As far as the judicial branch is concerned, the Court of Gagauzia
acts as an appeal forum for local judicial districts. Its judges
are appointed by the President of the Republic of Moldova on proposal
of the Assembly of Gagauz-Yeri. The Chief Judge of the Court of
Gagauzia is by definition a member of the Supreme Court of Moldova.
A similar sharing of responsibilities may be observed with regards
to the Office of Attorneys of Gagauz-Yeri. The Head of the Department
of Interior ('Interior Minister') is appointed by the Interior
Minister of Moldova, on proposal of the Governor, and subject
to the approval of Halc Toplosu. He in turn appoints local police
chiefs in the name of the Moldovan Interior Ministry.
On the date of the adoption of the Law on Gagauz autonomy (December
23, 1994), the Parliament also adopted a resolution providing
for the execution of the Act by defining steps that had to be
taken by the Government within the following month. This declaration,
among others, called for a joint committee to be set up from representatives
of the central government and those of the southern administrative
districts of Moldova.
The referendum determining the exact boundaries of the Gagauz
Autonomous Territory was held on March 5, 1995 in 36 localities
of 5 rayons in Southern Moldova, with a voters' turnout of about
70%. The concept was approved in 27 localities: 90% voted for
the autonomy, and only 9 districts failed to muster the necessary
number of votes (e.g. Vulcanesti, Taraclia, Ceadir Lunga, which
were mainly inhabited by Bulgarians). Comrat became the capital
of the newly formed Gagauz Autonomous Territory.
Post-1945 international law basically destroyed the system of
minority protection set up some 25 years earlier, following the
Paris Peace Treaties, by the League of Nations. The pattern drawn
up after World War I was based on the unquestionable fact that
the states created after the collapse of the empires of Central
and Eastern Europe were not much more homogeneous in terms of
ethnic composition than their predecessors. Consequently, new
states were obliged to provide a high degree of self-government
and autonomy to their respective national minorities. (It is a
different matter that in the given political circumstances, this
system did not work perfectly, to say the least.)
Serious deficiencies of the system of the Paris Peace Treaties
are generally acknowledged to have played a crucial part in the
outbreak of World War II. However, provisions referring to the
collective rights of minorities were blamed, on grounds that they
had helped Nazi aggressiveness in pursuing expansionist policies
(the example of Sudetenland and the Munich Agreement is often
cited in this context). Using this reasoning as a pretext, the
case of national minorities was deliberately swept off the international
agenda after World War II. The whole question was placed in the
framework of universal human rights. This approach, however, considers
only rights of persons, but certainly not those of groups. Opponents
of the collective concept argue that deviating from the universal
aspect would mean an unreasonable discrimination of a minority
vis-à-vis the majority: on these grounds were autonomist
demands labeled 'separatist' following World War II. Nevertheless,
the fact of the matter is that even some 'individual' rights have
their 'collective' dimensions, also: their fulfilment cannot be
achieved unless they are practised by all members of the community
together (e.g. use of native language, practice of religion, education).
Not surprisingly, collective rights and/or autonomy concepts proved
to be indispensable in resolving some age-old ethnic conflicts
in Western Europe. For instance in Italy, the German-speaking
minority - in South Tyrol - has been enjoying full autonomy within
the province of Bozen/Bolzano in the northernmost Italian region
of Trentino-Alto-Adige since 1972. The special status of the Åland-islands
in Finland, in addition to the full cultural self-government of
the Swedes of Finland, is often referred to as the ideal level
of minority protection. Collective rights and autonomy may not
coincide, as the example of Corsica shows: although France rejected
the existence of the 'Corsican people' (i.e. denied their collective
rights), Paris was willing to offer special status to the island
on administrative grounds in 1991. In spite of the fact that as
of now no international regulation obliges states to create special
self-governing institutions for their minorities, the aforementioned
models are success stories that prove the legitimacy of autonomy
concepts. Especially the French example is of crucial importance,
since, out of Western democracies, Paris has probably been the
state most vehemently refusing special status for its minorities.
For historical reasons, the problems mentioned above are of huge
significance in Central and Eastern Europe. It is not difficult
to discover that communism did not solve the 'national question'.
Moreover, minority status in several countries of our region meant
double oppression. Events after 1989-90, the sudden resurgence
of national feelings, and the tendency of some governments to
pursue a policy aimed at the creation of homogenous nation-states
through various tools of assimilation led to inter- and intra-state
tensions. These tensions are fuelled by mutual frustration. Frustration
of the minority for being reminded over and over again of its
'second-degree' status (language restrictions, lack of understanding
from the majority side, collectively pointed at as scapegoats
for alleged historical sins, sometimes forced to bear provocations),
and frustration of the majority which sees minority rights as
'concessions' made to historical 'oppressors', and regards the
encouragement of minority culture as despisal of its own. Majority
nationalisms, which are much more dangerous than minority ones,
can only look at bilateral (majority-minority) relationship as
a subordination, a zero-sum game: either as a ruler, or as being
ruled over. No attempt is made to regard the minority as an equal
partner. 'Autonomy' in their reading equals 'ethnic enclave',
and identified with nothing less than the destruction of the fundamental
values of the state itself.(6)
That is why the special status of the Gagauz community in Moldova
is of paramount importance. It set an example of both territorial
autonomy and of minorities' collective rights, for the first time
in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism. It
proved that this method can offer a sensible remedy to concerns
of all sides. There is no word about the territorial integrity
or the unity of the Republic of Moldova being harmed in any way,
and rights of the Gagauz minority are as secured as they can possibly
be.
Not all provisions of this concept should be taken as essential
components of an autonomy, as by all means the Gagauz self-government
is indeed a far-reaching one. (It is worth noting that a special
panel of the Council of Europe raised objections criticizing the
excessive downward delegation of powers to the autonomous region.)(7)
If and when autonomies are at some time established in our region,
however, they must have one single objective inherent in their
structure: the aim of providing equal chances and opportunities
for majority and minority identities to flourish. That is the
key conclusion to be drawn from Moldova's Gagauz autonomy.
2 Moldova adopts new Constitution. RFE/RL Daily Report no. 143,
29 July 1994.
3 The original Moldovan (Romanian) version of the law is available
in Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova, January 14,
1995. For readers of Hungarian, a non-official translation may
be found in Pro Minoritate, 1995/2. No English version
has been published that I am aware of.
4 Demirel in Moldova. RFE/RL Daily Report no. 105, 6 June 1994.
5 Moldova granting autonomy to Gagauz. RFE/RL Daily Report no.
143, 7 July 1994.
6 Kovács Péter: Nemzetközi jog és kisebbségvédelem.
Osiris-Századvég. Budapest 1996. 41.
7 Moldovan concessions to Gagauz deemed excessive. RFE/RL Daily
Report no. 127, 7 July 1994.
